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Abstract
In recent years, the international 
community has closely monitored the 
actions of Syrian president, Bashar-al 
Assad. Since the outbreak of the Syrian 
Civil War in 2011, President Assad has 
continued to incite widespread violence 
throughout Syria by committing mass 
atrocities that violate international 
laws. There is evidence to provide 
proof of President Assad’s connection 
to his crimes and that his crimes 
have killed and displaced millions 
of Syrians. However, the legalities of 
indicting a head of state and the special 
interests between the members of 
the United Nations Security Council 
create obstacles that make prosecuting 
President Assad near impossible in 
a traditional international court. 
This paper analyzes the prospects of 
President Assad being indicted by the 
international community and tried 
in a court for violating international 
laws. The cases of Slobodan Milošević 
and Charles Taylor are used to closely 
examine both the similarities and 
differences as they apply to President 
Assad. The close examinations and 
comparisons of these cases serve as 
the method in determining the best 
model for achieving an indictment and 
trial for President Assad. This paper 
further examines how the creation and 
implementation of a special tribunal 
for President Assad’s case is the best 
available option for indicting President 
Assad on international law charges and 
holding a trial for his case. 
 Syria has been devastated by 
civil war and contentious politics for 
nearly seven years. In 2011, a protest 
opposing Syrian President, Bashar al-
Assad, turned into a full-scale civil war 
in Syria (“Why is there a War,” 2018). 
However, the primary concern in Syria 
has not only been years of violent civil 
war and protests, but rather the focus has 
been on President Bashar al-Assad and 
his tactics for fighting in Syria’s civil war 
(Human Rights Watch, 2018). During 
Syria’s civil war, Assad has violated 
international laws and human rights by 
using torture, chemical weapons and 
nerve agents, starving and withholding 
humanitarian aid to Syrians, forcing 
disappearances and displacing 
thousands of Syrians (Human Rights 
Watch, 2018). These acts have resulted 
in the deaths of thousands of civilians 
and forced as many as 23 million pre-
war Syrians out of the country (Ali & 
Escritt, 2018). Assad has clearly violated 
international law for years and has yet 
to face the international court for his 
crimes. This paper explores whether 
there is a possibility that Assad could 
be indicted by the international 
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community and tried in a court for 
violating international laws. If so, how 
should the international community 
pursue a trial and convict Assad of 
international crimes? This paper will 
evaluate the prospects of indicting and 
trying Assad by examining the cases 
of the former president of Yugoslavia, 
Slobodan Milošević and the former 
president of Liberia, Charles Taylor. 
This paper will draw on both of these 
cases as models for designing a special 
international tribunal to try Assad for 
violating international laws. 
 In 2000, following the death 
of Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad, 
Assad was elected to a seven-year 
term as Syria’s president before being 
re-elected in 2007 (Bashar al-Assad, 
2018). Though many Syrians opposed 
the transfer of power from father to 
son, Syrians along with much of the 
international community were hoping 
Assad’s age, education, and exposure 
to western culture would usher in a 
new era of government characterized 
by democracy and economic growth. 
Assad promised Syrians a wide 
array of reforms such as reviving the 
economy, combating corruption, and 
implementing a more democratic 
means of government (“Syrian 
President,” 2018). For the first time in 
decades, independent newspapers 
were permitted to publish and hold 
public political forums for those who 
were pressing for government reforms 
(“Syrian President,” 2018). Assad also 
released hundreds of political prisoners, 
but despite the optimism of Syrians 
and the international community, 
Assad has continued to pursue hardline 
stances on policy and use authoritarian 
methods of governing. By 2001, not 
only were the limitations on the press 
put back in place, but public political 
forums were closed and individuals 
leading opposition toward the Syrian 
government were arrested (Bashar al-
Assad, 2018). 
Assad’s Atrocities 
Following Assad’s actions in March 
of 2011, after a number of teenagers 
were arrested and tortured for 
painting revolutionary slogans at 
a school, there was an outbreak of 
peaceful pro-democracy protests in 
the city of Derra. Government security 
forces sought to control the political 
uprisings by using live ammunition 
during protests resulting in the death 
of several protesters. This event 
triggered thousands of protesters to 
take to the streets throughout Syria 
to protest Assad’s presidency and call 
for his resignation as Syrian president 
(“Syria: The Story,” 2016). Government 
opposition forces began to take up arms 
as an act of defense and later used their 
weapons to oust government security 
forces from localities. As the violence 
throughout Syria escalated, Syria 
descended into a full-scale civil war. 
By June 2013, reports from the United 
Nations (U.N.) estimated the death toll 
to be at 90,000 people (“Syria: The Story,” 
2016). Seven years since the emergence 
of the Syria’s civil war, as many as 
400,000 people have been killed and at 
least five million have fled Syria; leading 
to the displacement of six million people 
internally (Human Rights Watch, 2018). 
Since the outbreak of the civil war in 
Syria, Assad’s regime has resorted to 
fighting government opposition groups 
by means that violate international 
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laws and human rights (“Why is there a 
War,” 2018). Assad has guided deliberate 
and indiscriminate attacks against 
civilians and infrastructure belonging 
to civilians by using chemical weapons 
and nerve agents in areas under the 
control of opposition groups (Human 
Rights Watch, 2018). Government 
forces have led more than 100 chemical 
attacks resulting in the deaths of 
thousands of civilians (Shaheen, 2016). 
In 2015 alone, Assad was responsible for 
69 chemical attacks and has continued 
to use chemical weapons with nerve 
agents on four occasions in 2016 and 
on at least four occasions in 2017 
(Shaheen, 2016). In addition to these 
chemical attacks, Assad’s government 
forces have dropped chlorine on eight 
separate occasions (Human Rights 
Watch, 2018). Assad’s regime has also 
employed starvation, the withholding 
of humanitarian aid, and the forcible 
displacement of Syrians as tactics 
during the war. Reports from the U.N. 
indicate that by 2017 government and 
pro-government forces had trapped an 
estimated 540,000 persons in besieged 
areas with rapidly deteriorating humane 
conditions causing communities in 
besieged areas to surrender to Assad’s 
government forces (Human Rights 
Watch, 2018). The Syrian Network for 
Human Rights has documentation 
indicating over 4,000 arbitrary arrests 
have been conducted by Assad’s forces 
and as of 2017 more than 80,000 people 
remain disappeared. Such torture 
and ill-treatment in detention and 
forced disappearances have continued 
throughout Syria (Human Rights 
Watch, 2018). 
 Assad has persistently violated 
international laws and could be charged 
with international crimes. Because of 
Assad’s use of chemical weapons, he 
could be charged with the illegal use of 
chemical weapons in addition to being 
charged with crimes that span the seven 
years of the civil war (Kelly & Whiting, 
2018). These criminal acts punishable 
under international law include: 
attacking and detaining civilians and 
prisoners of war, subjecting civilians and 
prisoners to torture, and Syrians being 
forcibly displaced by the Assad regime 
(Kelly & Whiting, 2018). Each of these 
crimes are considered to be criminal 
acts worthy of punishment according to 
customary international laws, which are 
the Geneva Conventions. However, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC or 
the Court) has codified these customary 
laws and the ICC recognizes a separate 
statute, the Rome Statute. Each of the 
international crimes mentioned are 
categorized as international crimes 
under the Rome Statute (Kelly & 
Whiting, 2018). The Rome Statute was 
adopted on July 17, 1998 at a diplomatic 
conference in Rome, Italy. The Rome 
Statute was later ratified in 2002 and is 
supported by more than 120 different 
countries. This international treaty 
established the ICC and the Trust Fund 
for Victims (TFV), which is used to 
implement reparations by the ICC and 
provide both physical rehabilitation 
and psychological rehabilitation in 
addition to providing material support 
to victims (“Rome Statute”). The statute 
provides legal definitions for crimes like 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and crimes of aggression. 
Essentially, the Rome Statute acts an 
instrument that guides the legalities 
of the ICC by elaborating on core legal 
texts that form much of the framework 
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of the ICC (“Rome Statute”). According 
to the Rome Statute, Assad’s actions 
over the course of the last seven years 
of the Syrian Civil War directly violate 
article seven in regards to crimes against 
humanity and torture and article eight 
in reference to war crimes and the use of 
prohibited weapons. Therefore, Assad, 
if indicted, could be charged with war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, the 
illegal use of chemical weapons, and 
torture in accordance with the Rome 
Statute (The International Criminal 
Court, 1998). 
 Assad has committed 
international crimes that violate the 
Rome Statute; however, the ICC only 
has the jurisdiction to indict and try 
offenders from states that signed the 
Rome Statute, and Syria is not a signatory 
of the Rome Statute. This is problematic 
when trying to indict Assad and put him 
on trial for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, the illegal use of chemical 
weapons, and torture, there is another 
option (“Seeking Justice,” 2017). Another 
option to indict Assad is to get a referral 
to the ICC from the U.N. Security 
Council. The UN Security Council is 
comprised of a total of 15 members. Five 
of these members: The United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, China, and 
the Russian Federation are permanent 
members. In addition to these five 
permanent members, there are another 
ten non-permanent members that are 
elected to the U.N. Security Council by 
the General Assembly to serve two-year 
terms (“Members”). This referral would 
grant the necessary jurisdiction for the 
ICC to indict and try Assad. However, 
this is not likely to be a viable option 
because there has to be a unanimous 
vote from the U.N. Security Council to 
refer Syria to the ICC (“Seeking Justice,” 
2017). In 2014, the U.N. Security Council 
voted on a resolution to allow the ICC 
to go after officials in Syria for charges 
of crimes against humanity. Though 
the ten non-permanent members of 
the UN Security Council voted in favor 
of the resolution alongside three of the 
permanent members, Russia and China 
vetoed the resolution (Sengupta, 2014). 
Obstacles to Trying Assad for 
International Crimes 
 Both China and Russia have 
special interests in Syria. China has 
been offering the Assad regime financial 
support as well as expressing interest in 
playing a key role in the reconstruction 
of Syria after the civil war. China sees 
post-war opportunities to expand the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in key 
regions of the Middle East. Assad will 
need to make considerable investments 
in infrastructure reconstruction, 
services which BRI could provide 
and China sees this as a business 
opportunity (Kowalewski, 2018). Russia 
has military bases located in Syria and 
in 2015, Russian forces launched an air 
campaign as a symbol of support to the 
Assad regime (“Why is there a War,” 
2018). Russia has special interests in 
Syria because Moscow exports arms to 
Syria and generates a profit and Russia’s 
motive to support Assad’s regime is also 
out of fear that Syria could collapse 
with Russia’s support (Hill, 2013). China 
and Russia have interests in Syria 
compelling both states to vote against 
any resolutions allowing the ICC to have 
jurisdiction in Syria. Therefore, other 
alternatives involving the international 
community will need to be utilized if 
Assad is going to be held accountable 
for the international crimes he has 
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committed during the Syrian Civil War.
 The possible options available to seek 
the indictment of Assad rely greatly on 
the cooperation of the international 
community, there are questions as to 
if this will even be possible and how a 
special tribunal would be structured 
without the involvement of the ICC. 
Assad, being the head of state in Syria, 
also poses other unique concerns seeing 
how indicting and trying a head of state 
is a difficult process. Historically, the 
difficulty of this process comes from a 
customary principle in international law 
based on state immunity (Mandhane, 
2011). Traditionally, a custom of 
international law is for the sitting head 
of state to have “personal” immunity 
while presiding in office where they 
will be immune from foreign criminal 
jurisdiction. State immunity recognizes 
the functions of the head of state making 
this custom of international law more 
expansive than diplomatic immunity or 
any other type of functional immunities. 
State immunity recognizes the high-
levels of diplomacy, negotiations, and 
dispute settlements (Kiyani, 2013). A 
Sitting head of state’s immunity is not 
exclusive to when the head of state 
is traveling for official government 
business, but state immunity may also 
apply when the head of state is traveling 
for pleasure. However, the “personal” 
component of state immunity afforded 
to a head of state belongs to that of the 
government, not the individual head of 
state. Therefore, state immunity is not 
permanent and may be waived by the 
government at any time. Subsequently, 
once the head of state no longer presides 
of the state’s office, state immunity will 
no longer be afforded to the head of 
state (Kiyani, 2013). As Syria’s head of 
state, Assad is afforded immunity under 
customary international law, which 
further complicates the process of 
indicting Assad while he is still in power. 
Since the end of the Cold War, there have 
been less than seventy heads of state 
that have withstood trial for violating 
international laws. While holding 
leaders such as Slobodan Milošević 
and Charles Taylor accountable in a 
court may have seemed like a daunting 
and unachievable task, such tasks 
have been accomplished. Though the 
number of heads of state who have been 
indicted and put on trial is small, such 
indictments and trials of high authority 
government figures have been made 
possible due to a more recent emergence 
of special courts and tribunals 
(Mandhane, 2011). The last option of 
constructing a special court or tribunal 
is the most viable option for indicting 
and putting Assad on trial. Analyzing 
the cases of Milošević and Taylor are 
best for comparison and determining 
if holding Assad accountable for his 
crimes will ever be possible. 
The Case of Slobodan Milošević
As previously mentioned, indicting 
and trying a head of state for violating 
international laws is a difficult process. 
However, the international community 
did have success in the case of Slobodan 
Milošević, former president of Serbia 
from 1980 to 1997 and former president 
of Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000. 
Milošević was indicted and put on 
trial in an effort by the international 
community to convict Milošević for 
violating international laws during his 
presidencies (Allcock, 2018). In 1987, 
Milošević was elected as the President 
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of the Communist Party of Serbia 
and implemented a political style of 
government centered on populism. 
Milošević’s populist style of government 
was appealing to Serbians, which 
allowed Milošević to gain popularity 
from Serbians who then began to call for 
an “antibureaucratic revolution” over the 
heads of the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia (Allcock, 2018). This allowed 
Milošević to restore Serbia’s control 
over Vojvodina and Kosovo and replace 
party leaderships in the provinces 
with his own party leadership while 
ousting the leadership of the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia. Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Macedonia seceded in 
1991. The Bosniaks and Croats of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina followed by a vote to 
secede in 1992 (Allcock, 2018). 
 Milošević’s responses to these 
successions resulted in the Yugoslav 
Wars of Succession from 1991 to 1999 
(Schulman, 2003). The Yugoslav Wars of 
Succession consist of four wars: the war 
in Slovenia in 1991; the war in Croatia 
from 1991 to 1995; the war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995; 
and the war in Kosovo from 1998 to 
1999 (“Slobodan Milosevic,” 2016). The 
Yugoslav Wars of Succession resulted in 
the redrawing of ethnic maps in Bosnian 
and Croatia where Milošević’s primary 
purpose was to ethnically cleanse 
Bosnia and Croatia. This was done 
with excessive force causing 250,000 
deaths and nearly 3.5 million persons 
to flee the country and become refugees 
(Schulman, 2003). To attack Croatia and 
Bosnia, Milošević utilized volunteer 
militias, and he also used the Yugoslavia 
army and joined forces with Franjo 
Tudjman of Croatia to help exercise 
forced movements of populations of 
people living across Croatia and Bosnia 
(Schulman, 2003). In addition to these 
forces, Serbia Montenegro’s Territorial 
Defense units, Serbian Ministry of 
Internal Affairs police units, and 
paramilitary units targeted, attacked, 
and seized control over and drove out 
populations of people residing towns, 
villages, and settlements within the 
territories of Bosnia and Croatia. Under 
the advisement of Milošević, these 
forces deported an estimated 170,000 
Croats and other non-Serb civilians; 
exterminated Croats and other civilians 
who were of Serbian ethnicity; and 
imprisoned thousands of Croats and 
non-Serbs holding them in inhumane 
conditions (“Slobodan Milosevic,” 
2016). Following massive airstrikes that 
had been deployed in Bosnia against 
Serbian forces, the 1995 Dayton peace 
agreement was forced through to end 
the war (Schulman, 2003). 
 In 1997, Milošević was elected 
by Yugoslavia’s federal parliament 
to serve as President of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. This allowed 
Milošević to maintain power since he 
had already served two terms as the 
president of Serbia and could not hold 
presidential office for a third term 
(Allcock, 2018). Later in 1998, there 
was a deteriorating relationship after 
years of dispute between Serbia and the 
ethnic Kosovo Albanians that led to the 
federal security forces and the guerrilla 
Kosovo Liberation Army to engage in 
open armed conflict. The consequences 
of the conflict were the killings of 
Serbian policemen and Serbian 
politicians and the Serbians launching 
an offensive to take out insurgents. 
Milošević then ordered an ethnic 
cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians. 
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This drove out hundreds of thousands 
of Kosovar Albanians out of the country 
and into neighboring countries as 
refugees (Allcock, 2018). In June of 
1999, the Serbian military and forces 
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
began to use tactics such as terror and 
systematic and widespread violence in 
Kosovo to target the Albanian Civilian 
population. The widespread violence 
and chaos compelled NATO to launch a 
military campaign between March and 
June of 1999. This military campaign 
supported by NATO coerced Serbian 
forces to withdraw military troops 
and military actions from Kosovo 
(“Slobodan Milosevic,” 2016). 
 While president of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Milošević 
violated international laws by allegedly 
leading a conspiracy in Kosovo to expel 
the Kosovo Albanian population. In 
addition to expelling nearly 800,000 
Kosovo Albanian civilians from Kosovo, 
other international crimes committed 
by Milošević during this event include: 
the systematic killing of Kosovo 
Albanian men, women, and children 
under the command of President 
Milošević; sexual abuse of women; 
and the systematic destruction and 
looting of Kosovo Albanian property 
(“Indictments”). As a result of Milošević 
ordering such actions to take place in 
Kosovo, in May 24, 1999, Milošević was 
indicted by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
on counts of deportation, crimes 
against humanity, and violations of the 
customs of war (Scharf, 1999). After 
Milošević’s indictment in 1999, unrest 
under his leadership and faltering 
economy contributed to Milošević’s 
being defeated by Vojislav Kostunica in 
the presidential elections in September 
2000. Later in 2001, the Yugoslav 
government arrested Milošević and he 
was turned over to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Allcock, 2018).
 After Milošević’s arrest and 
transfer of custody to the ICTY, he was 
indicted on October 8, 2001 for violating 
international laws while actively 
engaging in combat in Croatia. Soon 
after this indictment, the ICTY’s Office 
of the Prosecutor served Milošević 
with another indictment for violating 
international laws while fighting in 
combat in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 
both of these additional indictments, 
prosecutors alleged that Milošević, who 
at the time was the sitting president 
of the Republic of Serbia, was leading 
a conspiracy to ethnically cleanse the 
population. Prosecutors asserted this 
conspiracy was similar to the Kosovo 
conspiracy (“Indictments”). In Croatia, 
Bosnia, and Herzegovina, forces under 
the command of Milošević attacked 
villages, towns, and municipalities and 
then proceeded to take control of such 
areas. Milošević’s military forces gained 
control over territories by using a system 
to prosecute non-Serbs in order to push 
these non-Serbs out of the surrounding 
territories. Force was used during this 
process to expel men, women, and 
children from their homes, they were 
then gathered together to be held in 
camps where the living conditions were 
inhumane. In such camps, thousands 
of non-Serbs were beaten, sexually 
assaulted, tortured, and murdered. 
Altogether, Milošević was indicted on 
66 counts of violating international laws 
(“Indictments”). In July 2001, Milošević 
plead not guilty to all counts included in 
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the indictment for Kosovo; on October 
29, 2001 Milošević pled not guilty to all 
the counts included in the indictment 
for Croatia; and on December 11, 2001 
Milošević pled not guilty to all the 
counts included on the indictment for 
Bosnia (“Slobodan Milosevic,” 2016). 
Initially Milošević was charged on 
three separate indictments, during 
Milošević’s trial in February 2002 the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY moved 
to try the three separate indictments 
pertaining to Kosovo, Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in one trial 
(“Slobodan Milosevic,” 2016). 
 Milošević was indicted on 
multiple charges of crimes against 
humanity as well as violations of the 
customs of war, a notably missing 
charge on the indictment for Milošević’s 
actions in Kosovo is genocide. Milošević 
was responsible for ethnic cleansing 
and charges of genocide, being the 
most serious charges within a tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, would strengthen the 
prosecutor’s case. However, genocide 
requires evidence to show a precise 
intent to cleanse a territory or a 
particular ethnic group (Scharf, 1999). 
This makes genocide the most difficult 
crime to prove. In this instance, in order 
to prove the crime of genocide, evidence 
in the courtroom must show the intent 
to partly or entirely destroy an ethnic 
group by: murdering members of a 
targeted group; by causing serious 
physical harm or mental harm to persons 
of the targeted group; there must be 
deliberate intent to inflict conditions 
upon members of the targeted group 
that will cause physical destruction to 
part of the group or to the group as a 
whole; proving there were actions taken 
that would prevent procreation within 
the group; and by proving the exercise of 
force to transfer children of the targeted 
group to a different group (Scharf, 
1999). Therefore, getting a conviction 
for the crime of genocide was less likely 
because the tribunal’s precedent of the 
murdering of 340 Kosovo Albanians 
would not likely be considered genocide 
when the population was that of 1.8 
million (Scharf, 1999).
 While still President of 
Yugoslavia, Milošević was indicted by 
the ICTY and then tried in this same 
international criminal tribunal. The 
ICTY, was established in May 1993 by 
the U.N. is located in The Hague in the 
Netherlands (“About the ICTY”). The 
creation of this special tribunal was 
initially sparked by the mass atrocities 
that were taking place in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time. 
The ICTY was created to specifically 
answer to war crimes that were 
committed during the various conflicts 
in the Balkans in the 1990’s as well as 
to prosecute persons who were most 
responsible for violating international 
laws (“About the ICTY”). The ICTY was 
the first war crimes court created by 
the U.N. and has an estimated regular 
budget of approximately $180,000,000 
(“The Cost of Justice”). The court was 
funded by contributions made from 
member states of the U.N. The court 
has continually received funding from 
U.N. member states and has received 
other funding from non-governmental 
organizations as well as other 
institutions (“Support and Donations”). 
Milošević’s Trial 
Milošević’s trial began on February 12, 
2002 (Sadat, 2002). During the trial, 
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Milošević declined the appointment 
of a defense counsel and therefore 
represented himself throughout the 
extent of his trial (Scharf, 2006, 27). 
However, Milošević did have a team 
of legal experts who were helping him 
develop his case outside of the tribunal 
behind closed doors (Scharf, 2006, 
28). Ultimately, the representation of 
himself in court affected the amount of 
testimony that could be presented by the 
prosecution at trial as well as the overall 
length of the trial. Milošević suffered 
from a number of medical conditions 
that reduced the number of days court 
proceedings were held. Instead of the 
tribunal holding trial proceedings five 
days, the number of trial days a week 
was reduced to three days a week in 
addition to cutting the length of trial 
days from eight hours a day to four 
hours a day (Scharf, 2006, 27). Other 
delays such as the court adjourning for 
a period of a few weeks at a time for 
Milošević’s health conditions resulted 
in lost trial days. While Milošević’s 
poor health conditions drew out the 
length of the trial, the death of one 
of the presiding judges, Richard May, 
delayed the trial even further as a new 
judge had to be appointed to the bench 
in Judge May’s place (Scharf, 2006, 27). 
Other delays in the court include the 
uncooperativeness of Milosevic, whose 
defiant actions at times would have 
earned him expulsion in any other 
courtroom (Scharf, 2006, 28). 
 The tribunal agreed to 
hear charges relating to the Kosovo 
indictment first and then hear the 
charges relating to Croatia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina during a second phase 
of the trial (Sadat, 2002). Throughout 
the duration of Milošević’s trial, the 
prosecution claimed Milošević used 
army chiefs, military staff, interior 
ministers, security services, and 
presidents and prime ministers all 
of which were regarded as top-level 
officials from the governments of 
Yugoslavia, Bosnia, and Croatia. 
Prosecutors claimed Milošević used 
these various government officials and 
military officials as his co-perpetrators 
(“Prosecution Case”). The prosecution 
also argued Milošević provided the 
finances, personnel, logistical planning, 
and operational support to his co-
perpetrators so he would be able to 
seize territory in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Kosovo with better 
ease. Furthermore, prosecutors argued 
that the paramilitaries and police forces 
who committed the criminal acts had 
received orders to commit such crimes 
by Milošević and his co-perpetrators 
in addition to receiving appropriate 
funding and political support from 
Milošević (“Prosecution Case”). The 
prosecution made clear throughout 
their arguments how Milošević created 
an atmosphere that encouraged 
the victimization of civilians; an 
atmosphere that directly violates 
international laws, since according to 
international laws, political leaders, 
police forces, and military forces are 
legally obligated to protect the lives of 
civilians (“Prosecution Case”).
 In an effort to prove the 
credibility of their argument, the 
prosecution’s evidence in the trial 
included testimony, audio files, video 
content, and documentaries which 
were presented over the course of 90 
days during the trial. 293 witnesses 
were called upon by prosecutors during 
Milošević’s trial to testify (“Prosecution 
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Case”). Witnesses testifying during the 
trial included police experts, military 
experts, legal experts whose testimony 
centered on how there was legal 
subordination between the military 
and Milošević; and victims who used 
their testimonies to describe how they 
had suffered from the crimes Milošević 
had perpetrated. Witnesses also made 
remarks on the evidence presented 
demonstrating that Milošević had 
undermined legal chains of command. 
Forensic experts testified and presented 
evidence to the tribunal showing bodies 
that had been exhumed from graves in 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Kosovo and that those deaths had been 
caused by the commands of Milošević 
(“Prosecution Case”). Demographic 
experts showed the tribunal through 
their testimonies how there were 
drastic decreases in populations of 
people who were not Serbs living in 
territory controlled by Milošević. 
The court also heard testimony from 
international representatives and high-
level officials. Testimony from these 
individuals provided information in 
regards to meetings that had been 
held with Milošević where the co-
perpetrators gave reports on the acts of 
violence and crimes they were carrying 
out by following the orders of Milošević. 
Other witnesses who testified had 
worked under Milošević and were able 
to provide an insight into how Milošević 
operated (“Prosecution Case”). 
 The prosecution also 
submitted audio evidence, video 
evidence, and documentary evidence 
to the court. This evidence content 
amounted to 672 exhibits and over 
29,000 pages of documents. This 
evidence provided the court with 
minutes from meetings between 
Milošević and his co-perpetrators 
and voice audio recordings of their 
conversations (“Prosecution Case”). 
The video submitted into evidence 
showed Milošević overseeing military 
units, the same military units that were 
responsible for executing violate crimes 
that were in violation of international 
laws. Lastly, a preponderance of 
evidence was submitted to the court 
by prosecutors to stress that Milošević 
is the person who is most responsible 
for the suffering of thousands of victims 
(“Prosecution Case”). 
 As for the defense, Milošević 
represented himself during the trial. 
Despite his declining health, he proved 
to the court that his mental health and 
physical health were stable enough to 
act as his own defense. He proved the 
stability of his health to the tribunal 
as he routinely took command over 
cross-examining witnesses and the 
allegations asserted by the prosecution 
surrounding the atrocities he allegedly 
committed (Sadat, 2002). As for his 
defense strategies, rather than seeking 
a dismissal or an acquittal, Milošević 
repeatedly denied the legitimacy and 
legalities of the ICTY and wanted to 
publicly discredit the tribunal (Scharf, 
2006, 32). This was his one consistent 
strategy in his defense throughout 
the trial. However, Milošević also 
consistently challenged and made 
efforts to damage the credibility of 
the witnesses brought forth by the 
prosecution and undermine witness 
testimonies (Sadat, 2002). Milošević’s 
defense largely concentrated on 
the Kosovo indictment (Slobodan 
Milosevic, 2016). Milošević focused on 
portraying himself as being a typical 
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civil servant to his country, and a 
president who had been kept in the 
dark about the major decision-making 
processes in reference to the events 
that occurred in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Kosovo throughout 
the 1990s (Bass, 2003). Milošević called 
on several witnesses to testify in his 
defense. Much of the defense’s witnesses 
included those who were part of Serbian 
security forces and had remained loyal 
to him. Other witnesses included 
Richard Holbrook, a former United 
States assistant secretary of state. 
Holbrook testified to the tribunal how 
during conflicts with Bosnia is 1995 that 
Milošević was the one responsible for 
reigning in Bosnian Serbs and being a 
key component to helping pave the way 
for the Dayton Accord. In addition to the 
defense calling on witnesses to testify, 
other forms of evidence submitted to 
the court were letters in support of 
Milošević (Bass, 2003). 
 Milošević’s trial began in 
2002 and the trial was still ongoing 
by March 2006 (Slobodan Milosevic, 
2016). Since 2001, Milosevic was being 
held in the U.N. detention center at 
The Hague. During the early morning 
hours on March 11, 2006 Milosevic 
was found dead in his holding cell 
(Simons & Smale, 2006). According 
to the autopsy report, Milošević’s had 
suffered from a heart attack resulting in 
his death (“Preliminary Autopsy,” 2006). 
Milošević’s trial was dismissed on March 
14, 2006. Despite, the premature ending 
of Milošević’s trial before a verdict could 
be reached, Milošević’s trial is still a 
critical case to examine when evaluating 
the possibilities of trying and indicting 
Assad for violating international laws. 
Not only was Milošević the first sitting 
head of state to be indicted and brought 
forth to answer before a special tribunal 
for allegedly violating international 
laws, but Milošević’s trial marked the 
end of an era where a sitting head of 
state was immune to being held legally 
responsible for violating international 
laws. Milošević’s trial set a precedent 
and since his trial heads of state like 
Saddam Hussein and Charles Taylor 
have been indicted and tried in special 
tribunals for violating international 
laws (“Weighing the Evidence,” 2006). 
Milošević’s Case Serves as a Model 
for Assad
Milošević’s case is applicable to Assad 
because the indictment and trial of 
Milošević is something many never 
thought could happen. Not only does 
Milošević’s case demonstrate that this 
is possible, but the ICTY shows the 
possibility of designing a special tribunal 
with the capacity to try complex cases. 
Since the trial, the structure of the ICTY 
has been used as an example for how 
to structure other special tribunals. 
Therefore, using the ICTY as a model 
would be useful in creating a tribunal 
that would have success in trying Assad. 
Assad is similar to Milošević in that 
both, while heads of states, allegedly 
have engaged in criminal activities that 
have violated international laws such 
as crimes against humanity and war 
crimes (Groll, 2013). Both Assad and 
Milošević’s means of carrying out such 
crimes have included torture, forcibly 
displacing thousands of native persons, 
and attacking civilians. A specific 
example of the parallels between the 
two cases can be seen between the 
events that took place Kosovo and those 
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happening in Syria under Assad. Serbs 
were being accused of systematically 
using force to displace a population of 
people and carrying out massacres to 
target and attack Albanians in Kosovo 
during the 1990’s. Meanwhile, Assad has 
been utilizing security forces in Syria 
to exploit chemical weapons to attack 
territories being ruled by Sunni rebels 
(Groll, 2013). Assad and Milošević’s 
cases overlap in terms of the crimes 
they both have committed and how they 
systematically carried out crimes that 
violated international laws. They are 
also similar in the aspect that Milošević 
was once a ruling head of state and the 
international community was doubtful 
of ever having the opportunity to hold 
Milošević accountable and Assad 
is currently a head of state who the 
international community has doubts if 
his power will ever diminish and allow 
for justice to be served. 
Table 1
A Similar Comparison of Slobodan 
Milošević and Bashar al-Assad
The Case of Charles Taylor
Milošević’s case is not the only case to 
101
Alexis Staubus
serve as a blueprint for indicting and 
trying Assad for violating international 
laws. Charles Taylor was the president 
of Liberia from 1997 to 2003 and was 
the first head of state to successfully be 
tried and convicted in a special tribunal. 
While in office, his presidency was largely 
marked by rebellion and conflict as he 
encouraged and executed a number 
of crimes during the civil war in Sierra 
Leone throughout the 1990s. During the 
civil war in Sierra Leone, government 
forces were trying to oppose attempts 
of ‘coup d’état’ being made by two rebel 
groups: The Revolutionary United Front 
and the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (“Charles Taylor,” 2018). Both 
rebel groups received support from the 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia as 
Taylor provided support to the rebel 
groups in forms of money, materials, 
personnel, weapons, ammunition, and 
military training. As president of Liberia, 
Taylor encouraged military actions 
of the Revolutionary United Front 
and the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council alliance. These military actions 
supported and funded by Taylor 
include the launch of armed attacks 
targeting civilians, humanitarian aid 
workers, and the peacekeeping forces 
sent by the U.N. During these attacks, 
murders, mutilations, rape, and the 
pillaging and abducting of civilians 
to be used as sex slaves were crimes 
in which Taylor became notorious for 
encouraging and executing (“Charles 
Taylor,” 2018). Taylor was also known for 
using war tactics involving the drugging 
of children and then utilizing them 
to mine for diamonds in order to pay 
for guns and gun ammunition. Taylor 
is responsible for the deaths of nearly 
50,000 people and the forced relocation 
of thousands of refugees and leaving 
Sierra Leone in debris as the country 
struggles to repair infrastructure and 
regain natural resources (Simons, 2012). 
Holding Taylor legally responsible in 
court for these serious crimes that he 
had a hand in executing during the 
civil war was made possible through 
the establishment of a special tribunal, 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL). The physical establishment of 
the SCSL is located in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone and the Appeals Chamber of 
the court is placed in close proximity 
to The Hague in Leidschendam, 
Netherlands (“Charles Taylor,” 2018). 
Locating the special tribunal in a 
neighboring country required the 
approval of the U.N. Security Council. 
The Security Council passed Resolution 
1315 formally requesting the U.N. 
Secretary-General to begin negotiations 
with the Sierra Leone government to 
create a special tribunal. In 2002, after 
Resolution 1315 was passed, the U.N. 
Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone 
government signed the Agreement on 
the Establishment of a Special Court for 
Sierra Leone formally establishing the 
creation of the SCSL (Perriello & Wierda, 
2006). The decision to locate the court 
in Sierra Leone was based on problems 
that the ICTY and other international 
criminal tribunals had faced with the 
tribunals being located in territories 
outside of where the atrocities were 
committed. Both tribunals had to 
find financial supporters to back the 
extraordinary expenses of the court, 
there were periods of slow progress, 
and lack of knowledge in regards to 
proceeding with victims under the 
court’s jurisdiction. In addition to trying 
to minimize such difficulties faced by 
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international tribunals, Sierra Leone 
was willing to host the SCSL because 
the location would emphasize respect 
for the sovereignty of Sierra Leone and 
encourage legitimacy in the rule of law 
and in the country’s domestic legal 
system (Perriello & Wierda, 2006). 
Taylor’s Trial
Taylor was indicted by the SCSL on 
March 7, 2003 on 17 counts of violating 
international laws. The 17 charges in 
the indictment included: war crimes 
for acts of terrorism, collectively 
punishing a civilian population, 
violence to life and persons, outrages 
of personal dignity, and the pillage and 
abductions of persons, all of which 
are prohibited by international laws. 
Taylor was also charged with crimes 
against humanity, which included the 
extermination of civilians, murder, 
rape, and the enslavement of persons 
(“Charles Taylor,” 2018). At the time of 
the indictment, Taylor was traveling 
outside of Liberia, so an international 
arrest warrant was issued for Taylor 
to immobilize and pressure him to 
return to Liberia (Wladimiroff, 2005). 
After pressure from the international 
community, on August 11, 2003 Taylor 
resigned from his office as president 
of Liberia. Later in 2006, Taylor was 
arrested near Cameroon and handed 
over to SCSL when he pled not guilty to 
the international crimes that had been 
charged with (“Charles Taylor,” 2018). 
However, on June 16, 2006, the SCSL 
was transferred to The Hague on the 
basis that the court proceedings being 
housed in Sierra Leone was inciting 
violence and threatening the peace 
and stability of West Africa. The trial 
was held by the SCSL while utilizing 
ICC courtrooms and then later due to 
scheduling conflicts the SCSL utilized 
the courtroom at the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (Special Court for Sierra 
Leone). After the transfer of the court to 
The Hague, six of Taylor’s charges were 
dropped to reduce the duration of the 
trial. Taylor’s trial began in June 2007 
at the SCSL in Freetown, Sierra Leone 
(“Charles Taylor,” 2018). Before the 
commencement of his trial, Taylor had 
agreed to be represented by a defense 
team and was generally cooperative. 
The court sat three years and ten 
months, which was approximately 420 
days of court (“Even a ‘Big Man’,” 2012).
As for evidence used in Taylor’s trial, 
1,522 exhibits were moved into evidence, 
115 witnesses gave testimony, and 281 
written decisions were issued. The 
prosecution called upon 94 witnesses to 
give testimony. Three witnesses testified 
as experts, 59 of the witnesses were 
persons who testified to the crimes 
that had been committed, and 32 of the 
witnesses were persons who testified to 
the links between the crimes that had 
been committed by Taylor himself. The 
prosecutors greatly relied on “insider” 
witnesses as an attempt to link Taylor 
to the serious crimes committed. These 
witnesses were those who were often 
suspected of committing serious crimes 
or had admitted to committing serious 
crimes (“Even a ‘Big Man’,” 2012). The 
prosecution used their evidence to 
claim Taylor was the provider of military 
training and support to the rebel 
groups in Sierra Leone. Prosecutors 
also used their evidence to argue 
Taylor had knowledge of the crimes 
being committed by the rebel groups 
he supported, or he at least should 
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have had knowledge of such events, 
and he failed to reasonably act and 
prevent further crimes or punish the 
rebel groups (“Even a ‘Big Man’,” 2012). 
The Rome Statute outlines a number of 
actions that are considered to be crimes 
against humanity. Additionally, as head 
of state, Taylor had a legal responsibility 
the protect the civilian population. 
When a head of state has knowledge of 
such acts being systematically directed 
against a civilian population and does 
not condemn such criminal acts, then 
the head of state is legally responsible 
(“International Criminal Court,” 1998). 
To prove Taylor’s innocence, the 
defense argued Taylor was a maker of 
peace who, through the capacity of 
presidential office, was trying to make 
settlement negotiations in a conflicted 
time in Sierra Leone. Additionally, the 
defense made claims in their arguments 
that Taylor’s trial was a conspiracy by 
the West to remove Taylor from power 
(“Charles Taylor,” 2018). During the trial, 
the defense called upon twenty-one 
witnesses to testify in order to challenge 
the claims of the prosecution. The 
witnesses were comprised of individuals 
who were prior leaders and fighters from 
the Revolutionary United Front and the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. 
Taylor also provided testimony during 
his trial (“Even a ‘Big Man’,” 2012). 
 On April 26, 2012, the Trial 
Chamber of the SCSL found Taylor 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on 
11 counts of planning, abetting, and 
aiding war crimes in addition to be 
found guilty of crimes against humanity. 
Taylor was also found guilty of planning 
attacks on areas rich in diamonds in 
Sierra Leone. However, according to 
the court’s judges, the prosecution 
failed to show proof of Taylor being 
individually responsible for the criminal 
acts committed beyond a reasonable 
doubt (“Even a ‘Big Man’,” 2012). Taylor 
was sentenced to serve 50 years in 
prison and following his conviction, he 
was transferred to Frankland Prison 
located in Durham, United Kingdom 
to serve his prison sentence (“Charles 
Taylor,” 2018). The location of where 
Taylor would serve his prison sentence 
if convicted was previously agreed 
upon by The Hague and the SCSL when 
the case was transferred. The Hague 
agreed to allow the SCSL to transfer the 
court to The Hague with the stipulation 
that if Taylor were convicted, then he 
would be imprisoned and serve his 
prison sentence in another country. 
The United Kingdom extended an offer 
to hold Taylor in a British prison if he 
were to be found guilty of the crimes. 
The Frankland Prison was chosen 
in particular because the Frankland 
Prison is a high-security prison with the 
capacity to house high-risk and high-
profile criminals (Summers, 2012). 
Taylor’s Case Serves as a Model for 
Assad
Charles Taylor’s case is significant 
because Taylor was the first head of 
state to be indicted and put on trial 
for international crimes since the 
Nuremberg trials (Mandhane, 2011). 
His case is also significant to finding 
a way to indict and try Assad because 
Taylor’s case can be seen as a blueprint 
for building a case against Assad. The 
current standings in Syria under Assad’s 
regime and Assad’s actions during 
the civil war in Syria share common 
elements with Taylor and the Sierra 
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Leone during the 1990s. For instance, 
Taylor was a head of state when he was 
indicted and Assad is currently is a 
head of state while perpetrating similar 
crimes to that of Taylor (Rose, 2012). 
Some of the crimes Assad has committed 
during the Syrian Civil War include: 
rape, targeting civilians, sieges, forced 
disappearances, forced displacements 
of thousands of Syrians, torture, and 
the murder of thousands of individuals 
throughout the country (Human Rights 
Watch, 2018). Each of these acts are 
considered to be war crimes and crimes 
against humanity (“Rome Statute”). 
During the civil war in Sierra Leone, 
Taylor committed crimes such as 
murder, the collective punishment of a 
civilian population, torture, abductions, 
and acts of terrorism. These actions 
are also considered to be war crimes 
and crimes against humanity (“Charles 
Taylor,” 2018). During Taylor’s trial the 
SCSL used reports from the U.N. in 
addition to media reports as evidence 
to prove Taylor had knowledge of the 
crimes being committed. As in the case 
with Assad, the U.N. has collected and 
continues to collect evidence for reports 
to show how the crimes committed are 
ongoing and the role Assad plays in 
such criminal acts (Rose, 2012). 
 In analyzing the similar 
characteristics between Assad and 
Taylor, Taylor’s case is an example of how 
indicting and trying Assad for violating 
international laws could be possible 
since Taylor was also a head of state 
who was under similar circumstances, 
committed similar crimes, and was 
still indicted and tried under pressure 
from the international community. In 
fact, some experts in international law 
agree that not only are the two cases 
similar, but the case against Assad is 
stronger than Taylor’s case was when he 
was president of Liberia. For instance, 
the SCSL heavily relied on facts that 
Taylor was often in contact with the 
Revolutionary United Front and the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
forces to plan and carry out crimes; 
however, the court found Taylor’s orders 
were advisory in nature as he operated 
through aides and the orders were not 
obeyed (Rose, 2012). This resulted in 
Taylor being found not guilty of ordering 
soldiers to commit crimes under the 
concept of superior responsibility 
since soldiers who were ordered to go 
to Sierra Leone to fight in the civil war 
did not stay under Taylor’s control. 
In contrast, reports from the U.N. 
Human Rights Council provide relevant 
information to prove that Assad directs 
the day-to-day commands of the Syrian 
military. Reports also indicate how 
operations violating human rights have 
been carried out by Syria’s military in 
a way that requires direction from the 
state. Therefore, Assad’s case has the 
element necessary for the conviction 
of ordering and planning crimes, the 
element Taylor’s case lacked showing 
how the Assad’s case is even stronger 
than Taylor’s case (Rose, 2012). Overall, 
the case of Charles Taylor provides 
a blueprint for how Assad could be 
indicted and put on trial for his actions. 
Table 2
A Similar Comparison of Charles Taylor 
and Bashar al-Assad
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Limitations to Creating Special 
Tribunals
Despite the examples of the SCSL and 
the ICTY, which are tribunals that were 
both successfully created to try complex 
violations of international laws, many 
tribunals are never even an option to 
consider (Bass, 2003). International 
tribunals are often not considered 
or are unsuccessful because of the 
significant costs of creating the tribunal 
and the continued expenses for keeping 
the tribunal running throughout the 
duration of a trial. The costs of tribunals 
are extensive because international 
tribunals are formed to investigate and 
try complex cases that involve terrorism, 
organized crime, white-collar crimes, 
as well as other crimes that fall under 
the category of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. Such crimes are by 
definition widespread and systematic 
crimes. Investigations of these crimes 
involve the examination of thousands 
of incidents that have occurred over 
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a period of years that often occur 
in remote locations and in multiple 
languages (Skilbeck, 2008). 
 The tribunal bears the 
responsibility of providing the budget 
for crime scene analysis and forensic 
evidence services which require 
considerable resources. The tribunal’s 
budget provides financing for travel 
expenses of the hundreds of victims, 
witnesses, and investigators called upon 
by the prosecution and the defense. 
Funds for a detention unit to transport 
and house suspects; security to protect 
the premises of the tribunal as well as 
the staffers, visitors, and suspects; and 
funds for building and facility costs 
and the salaries of staff members must 
also come from the tribunal’s budget. 
(“The Cost of Justice”). Translation 
services are a necessity in tribunals as 
well as the reconciliation of civil law 
and common law in order to establish 
and implement procedural rules and 
rules of evidence. Both of these services 
are time consuming processes and in 
international tribunals the more time 
a tribunal takes to try a case, the more 
funding a tribunal will need to continue 
operation. 
 The cost of tribunals such 
as the ICTY and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
individually reached as much as $100 
million per year (Dicker & Keppler, 
2004). Costs of a tribunal before the 
commencement of a trial could be as 
much as $708,000 as was the case in the 
ICTY. Unlike a simple murder trial in a 
national criminal justice that could last 
months, trials in international tribunals 
are so extensive because crimes being 
tried and the laws being applied are so 
complex. The set-up of the tribunal is 
time consuming and the proceedings 
of the trial may take years leading to 
excessive and unpredictable costs 
(Skilbeck, 2008). When considering 
an international tribunal as an option, 
after the cost-benefit analysis ratio of a 
tribunal, states often argue the financial 
investments of a tribunal are better 
used in post-conflict regions to support 
reconstruction and development. 
The financial burdens of financing 
tribunals are often outweighed leading 
to the unsuccessful implementation 
of international tribunals, despite the 
successes of the SCSL and the ICTY 
(Malone, 2008). 
Contrasts in the Cases of Assad, 
Milošević, and Taylor
There are similar comparisons between 
the cases of Assad, Milošević, and Taylor 
that allow for Milošević and Taylor’s 
cases to be viewed as models when 
determining how to try Assad under 
international laws. However, Assad’s 
case deviates from both Milošević’s 
case and Taylor’s case in ways that 
will likely pose new problems that the 
cases of Milošević and Taylor never 
had to contemplate. One of the most 
significant differences separating Assad 
from both Milošević and Taylor is how 
the Syrian Civil War has become a larger 
international conflict (“Why is there 
War,” 2018). For instance, the conflict’s 
actors are no longer just Assad and the 
rebel groups (Friedman, 2018). There 
are a number of state actors involved in 
Syria. For instance, Russia has military 
bases in Syria and has supported Assad 
by launching air campaigns. Russia 
has been a key influence in turning the 
Syrian civil war in Assad’s favor. Iran is 
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also involved in Syria’s civil war and has 
deployed hundreds of troops to assist 
Assad’s military and has financially 
supported Assad with billions of dollars. 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen have each 
sent armed and trained Shia Muslim 
militiamen, mostly from the terrorist 
organization Hezbollah, to fight for 
Assad (“Why is there War,” 2018). 
 The United States, France, 
and other Western countries have 
provided support to rebel groups in 
Syria. These states have carried out 
airstrikes against Assad and supported 
groups such as the Syrian Democratic 
Forces in an effort to capture territory 
from jihadists. Turkey has provided 
support to the rebels by containing 
the Kurdish military. Saudi Arabia has 
provided arms and financial support to 
the rebel groups. Israel has conducted 
hundreds of airstrikes against Syria 
in an effort to obstruct Iran’s military 
entrenchment in Syria and to obstruct 
Hezbollah from receiving weapons from 
Iran (“Why is there War,” 2018). Violence 
from the Syrian civil war has also spilled 
over into Jordan and is wearing on the 
social, economic, and political fabric 
of Jordan as the country has become 
a point of transit for external support 
for the rebel groups. This has led to 
Jordan being vulnerable to retribution 
from Iran’s Quds Force, Hezbollah, and 
other agents associated with Assad’s 
regime. The growing refugee population 
in Jordan is putting pressure on scarce 
water supplies and the state’s security 
since Jordan no longer has the capacity 
to bear such large numbers of refugees 
and is also being used as a port of entry 
for Syrian fighters, weapons, and money 
(Young, Stebbins, Frederick, & Al-
Shahery, 2014). 
 The Syrian civil war is 
recognized as an international conflict 
because of the number of states within 
the international community who 
have become entangled in the Syrian 
civil war. Additionally, many of the 
states have diverging interests with 
one another and their loyalties are split 
between Assad and the rebels triggering 
other conflicts between states. The 
Syrian civil war and diverging views 
of Assad’s regime is just part of the 
complex web of this war. Syria is also 
about the confrontation between two 
of the world’s largest military powers, 
the United States and Russia; two 
NATO members, the United States 
and Turkey; and sworn enemies, Israel 
and Iran. The Syrian civil war is at an 
intense international level, unlike that 
of the Balkans or Sierra Leone. States 
cannot make foreign policy or military 
decisions in Syria without taking into 
consideration the other states involved 
in Syria at the risk of starting another 
war (Friedman, 2018). This complicates 
solutions to indicting and trying Assad, 
especially since Assad has an ally like 
Russia who would likely provide Assad 
with protection from indictment and 
trial. 
 Kosovo suffered some of 
Milošević’s worst atrocities and 
unlike Syria, the war in Kosovo was 
less internationalized as the conflict 
was essentially contained within the 
Southern Balkans and had a minimal 
chance of spillover into neighboring 
states threatening to destabilize or 
engage other regions in conflicts 
(Kaplan, 2013). Kosovo is located in 
Europe, where the states north of the 
Balkans have democratic forms of 
government (Khazan, 2013). States 
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that are democracies are generally 
more stable states (Quinn & Wooley, 
2001). The more stable democratic 
states neighboring Kosovo were able 
to contain the ethnic conflict from 
spilling over into their borders and 
causing instability. In contrast, the 
undemocratic states surrounding 
Syria were already in the midst of 
instability themselves and Assad’s civil 
war has been spilling over into other 
neighboring states such as Lebanon 
and Turkey. This made interventionist 
strategies a more secure policy option 
in targeting Miloševic as there was less 
fear of inflaming unstable territories or 
causing conflicts between other states 
(Khazan, 2013). 
 Taylor’s conflict in Sierra Leone 
was an internationalized civil war; 
however, the Sierra Leone civil war was 
not on the same international level as 
Syria. West Africa has long been a region 
of civil wars and violence, and the civil 
wars in this region of Africa in particular 
often intimately affect neighboring 
states (Bah, 2013). The Sierra Leone civil 
war was no different in this sense as 
the civil war was produced by conflicts 
that were spilling over the border from 
Liberia into Sierra Leone during the 
Liberian civil war. The civil war in Sierra 
Leone was largely confined to Sub-
Saharan Africa. The interconnections 
between the Sierra Leone civil war and 
Liberian civil war did not incite any 
additional violence in the West African 
community (Fyfe, Sesay, & Nicol, 2018). 
 There were other outside 
actors who engaged in the conflict 
taking place in Sierra Leone such as 
the United Kingdom who sent troops 
to Sierra Leone in order to secure 
efforts for evacuations, provide security, 
and provide operational training and 
support to government forces. Nigeria 
sent the Economic Community of 
West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) to Sierra Leone to try to end 
the rebellion and maintain stability. The 
U.N. intervened and worked to create 
the United Nations Mission to Sierra 
Leone, a peacekeeping force designed to 
enforce the Lomé Peace Accord, which 
provided cease fires provisions and 
provisions for disarming combatants 
and utilizing power-sharing to create 
a political settlement (World Peace 
Foundation, 2015). As already noted, 
Liberia was a state actor involved in 
Sierra Leone since Liberian President 
Taylor is responsible for inciting a civil 
war in Sierra Leone. South Africa is also 
recognized as being engaged in Sierra 
Leone since the International Monetary 
Fund pushed South Africa to intervene 
because the International Monetary 
Fund was providing Sierra Leone 
government with financial support to 
destroy the rebellion in the country 
(World Peace Foundation, 2015). Lastly, 
the United States was involved in the 
Sierra Leone civil war, but the United 
States did not have direct involvement. 
The United States privately pressured 
the Sierra Leone government to make 
a negotiation with the rebel forces 
and negotiate a peace agreement. 
Despite members of the international 
community responding to the civil 
war in Sierra Leone and neighboring 
countries being affected by the civil 
war, some of the largest and most 
influential members of the international 
community, such as the United States 
and Russia were not directly involved 
in the civil war in Sierra Leone. Though 
this was an internationalized conflict, 
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conflicting interests between the states 
in regards to Sierra Leone did not foster 
risks of new wars between the states 
(World Peace Foundation, 2015). 
 Assad diverges again from 
Milošević and Taylor when comparing 
the leadership stability of Assad 
compared to the leadership stability 
of Milošević and Taylor. For instance, 
both Milošević and Taylor were ousted 
from political office, making both of 
the former presidents more vulnerable 
to being prosecuted for international 
crimes. Milošević began to fall from 
power in the spring of 1999 when 
NATO carried out an 11-week bombing 
campaign against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia after NATO states had 
failed to individually or collectively 
create policies to prevent Milošević 
from continually provoking wars in the 
Balkans. 
 Milošević accepted the 
demands of NATO after rationally 
calculating that continuing to resist the 
international community he was risking 
everything and had nothing to gain. If 
Milosevic continued to resist, he knew 
his actions would result in escalated 
bombings. His decision to capitulate 
rested on knowing a NATO military 
presence that would claim the rights to 
access all of Yugoslavia and having the 
ability to decide the future of Kosovo by 
the enforcement of a NATO referendum, 
which would cause a loss of all of Serbia. 
Overall, Serbia’s control over Kosovo 
and Milosevic’s personal rule and 
physical survival was at risk if Milosevic 
chose to resist (Lambeth, 2001). On June 
10, 1999 Milošević fell to his resistance 
and agreed to a peace agreement with 
NATO. The peace agreement called 
upon Milošević to remove his Serb 
forces from Kosovo, and Milošević’s Serb 
forces were replaced with peacekeeping 
troops from NATO (“NATO Bombs 
Yugoslavia,”2018). The bombings not 
only resulted in Milošević’s loss of 
Kosovo, but he was also stripped of 
his legitimacy and popularity from his 
deepest supporters and police forces at 
a time when his popularity was already 
dwindling. The NATO bombings created 
a united opposition who aligned with 
Vojislav Kostunica rather than Milošević 
during the 2000 election. This resulted 
in Milošević being defeated in the 2000 
presidential election and falling from 
power (Erlanger, 2000). 
 Even though Milošević had 
been indicted in 1999 as a sitting 
president, his electoral defeat during 
the 2000 presidential election made him 
more vulnerable to prosecution. Once 
Milošević was no longer president, 
he was not afforded the benefits of 
state immunity, making the process of 
arresting the former president easier 
for the ICTY. Additionally, his loss of 
power motivated the prime minister 
of Serbia, Zoran Djindjić, to have 
Milošević extradited to an American 
airbase located in Bosnia, where he 
was then taken into the custody of the 
ICTY and put on trial (Penrose, 2010). 
The NATO bombings were significant 
in that they caused Miloševi  to lose his 
deepest supporters and his legitimacy 
and indirectly aided in his presidential 
election defeat and opening a window 
of opportunity to ease the process of the 
ICTY gaining custody and ensuring a 
trial (Erlanger, 2000). 
  As for Taylor, he was forced 
out of the Liberian presidency in 2003 
and into exile. After the U.N. imposed 
sanctions on Liberia to punish Taylor 
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for his atrocities and refusal to negotiate 
a peace deal civil war in Sierra Leone 
continued to escalate. This prompted 
the international community to 
condemn Taylor as Liberian president 
and call for Taylor to relinquish 
his presidency (“Charles Ghankay 
Taylor,” 2017). After condemnation 
and continued widespread war and 
violence, Taylor and the rebels came to 
a peace agreement to end Liberia’s civil 
war, which would also declare the war 
to be over in Sierra Leone as well. In the 
peace agreement both parties agreed 
that the fighting would cease if Taylor 
stepped down as president of Liberia 
and was exiled from the country. Charles 
would only agree to the peace deal if he 
received asylum. Taylor accepted an 
offer from Nigeria for asylum and Taylor 
relinquished his power as president on 
August 11, 2003. Vice president, Moses 
Blah, ascended the Liberian presidency 
and the wars in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone ceased as planned and Taylor left 
the country to live in asylum in Nigeria 
(“Liberian President,” 2003). 
 Initially, under the terms of the 
agreement, when Taylor sought asylum 
in Nigeria he was still given immunity 
from being arrested and tried for 
international crimes. However, while 
living in exile in Nigeria, human rights 
groups found Taylor to be violating 
the terms of the peace agreement by 
interfering with politics in Liberia and 
trying to escape from Nigeria. Taylor 
was arrested by Nigerian authorities 
for his attempted escape and lost his 
rights to immunity under the peace 
agreement (“Charles Taylor ‘Duped’,” 
2009). After violating the terms to 
the peace agreement, in March 2006, 
Liberia requested Taylor’s extradition 
and Nigeria agreed to the extradition 
(“Charles Ghankay Taylor,” 2017). Once 
Taylor was turned over to Liberia, he was 
vulnerable to prosecution, and the SCSL 
seized the opportunity to apprehend 
Taylor and try him for international 
crimes (Romano & Nollkaemper, 2003). 
Assad’s situation conflicts with 
Milošević’s and Taylor’s because his 
leadership has more stability, which 
poses additional complications to 
indicting and trying him. For example, 
Syria, like Kosovo, has been the target of 
military style attacks as well. In 2007, as 
a form of retribution for using chemical 
weapons on civilians, the United States 
launched 59 tomahawk cruise missiles 
into Syria targeting a Syrian air base 
(Cooper, Gibbons-Neff, & Hubbard, 
2018). In 2018, the United States and 
European allies once again launched 
airstrikes to punish Assad yet again for 
another chemical attack. Unlike Kosovo, 
the airstrikes failed to be instrumental 
in Assad losing legitimacy or shaking 
Assad into fear (Cooper, Gibbons-Neff, 
& Hubbard, 2018). Also, like Taylor, 
Assad has received international 
condemnation and has been asked to 
relinquish his presidency (Alrifai, 2017). 
However, Assad has no intentions to 
step down from his presidency. Assad 
has publicly addressed the calls for 
him to step down as Syria’s president 
by saying that Syria is facing a national 
challenge, and a president does not 
run from challenges and he will not be 
stepping down as president of Syria. 
Assad has denied requests to renounce 
his presidency; therefore, thinking 
Assad will be open to negotiating 
peace deals that would include sending 
him into exile is unrealistic (“Syria’s 
President,” 2012).
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 In contrast with Milošević and 
Taylor’s cases, Assad’s future as Syria’s 
president seems to be more secure 
than ever. No one who remains on the 
battlefield in Syria is either unwilling 
or does not have the ability to topple 
Assad’s regime. The rebel forces are 
weakening and beginning to embrace 
the possibility of the inevitable rule of 
Assad. Rebel occupied territories have 
shrunk, and international powers are 
losing interest in supporting the rebels 
and turning their focus to eliminating 
the Islamic State (Hubbard, 2017). 
President Trump has cancelled the 
clandestine American program that 
allowed the Central Intelligence Agency 
(C.I.A.) to covertly provide the Syrian 
rebel groups with arms and supplies. The 
program was ended because President 
Trump recognized the program was 
failing. He began to recognize that 
toppling Assad in the near future is 
unlikely (Sanger, Schmitt, & Hubbard, 
2017). Regional powers and even foreign 
officials along with Syrians have started 
running operations as if Assad will 
remain in power. Assad’s allies perceive 
Syria as an impending victory with 
talks about how the rebuilding of Syria 
will take place. Syria even hosted an 
international trade fair in 2017 where 
Assad signed an agreement with Iran 
to rebuild Syria’s power grid (Hubbard, 
2017). 
 Russia has also helped Assad’s 
forces become more advanced, which 
has allowed for Assad to regain lost 
territory and have more success in 
the war since Russia’s intervention 
(Hubbard, 2017). In 2017, Russia’s 
president, Vladimir Putin, pledged 
Russia’s full support to protecting 
the sovereignty of Syria as well as the 
state’s territorial integrity. Putin has 
remained committed to protecting 
the Assad regime and will likely 
provide protections to Assad if he is 
to be indicted on charges of violating 
international laws (Tétrault-Farber 
& Williams, 2017). Not only were 
Milošević and Taylor’s conflicts not 
as internationalized as Assad’s, but 
neither Milošević or Taylor had a state 
as influential as Russia to intervene and 
pledge to protect their state sovereignty 
and territory or provide them with such 
vast amounts of military and financial 
support. 
How a Special Tribunal and 
Indictment Can Work for Assad
The primary focus of this paper is to 
evaluate the prospects of indicting and 
trying Assad for violating international 
laws, and after a detailed evaluation 
of the similar cases of Miloševi  and 
Taylor, the prospects of the international 
community holding Assad accountable 
in court for violating international 
laws are likely. The Commission for 
International Justice and Accountability 
(CIJA) prosecutes some of the worst 
human rights criminals throughout the 
world and works to deter human rights 
abuses though litigation, policy, and 
transnational justice strategies (The 
Center for Justice & Accountability). 
CIJA is located in at an undisclosed 
location in Western Europe and 
employs 150 workers, whom are non-
Syrians who have experience working in 
special tribunals. Since the outbreak of 
the civil war in Syria in 2011, CIJA has 
been working underground to collect 
evidence and prepare indictments as if 
Assad or other high-ranking government 
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officials from his regime were to go 
trial any day (Carrillo, Frillmann, & 
Molinsky, 2016). Currently, CIJA has 
collected nearly a million documents 
that would be used as evidence at a trial 
in an effort to convict Assad and other 
high-ranking officials that are traced 
back to Assad’s crimes. The information 
systems in Syria’s government are not 
as advanced as those in the developed 
world, so a single sheet of paper has to 
be passed from desk-to-desk and each 
person must either sign or initial the 
paper with their comments. CIJA has 
been able to collect nearly a million of 
these government documents and use 
them to show Assad as presiding over 
the chain of command from the highest-
level and ordering international crimes 
to be executed on a mass level across 
Syria. CIJA has also been able to link 
the crimes back to all of Syria’s security 
branches and high-ranking officials 
(Carrillo, et al., 2016). 
 Several hundred victim 
witnesses have been interviewed by 
CIJA to secure patterns of perpetration 
as part of the pattern evidence (Carrillo, 
et al., 2016). Continuing to collect this 
kind of fresh evidence is vital because 
once the war in Syria ends, evidence 
collection will become an even more 
dangerous and difficult process. The 
more evidence CIJA collects generates 
a higher probability of Assad being held 
accountable for his crimes as saying 
no to holding Assad accountable in 
court will be difficult when there are 
mountains of evidence against him that 
have been collected (Kelly & Whiting, 
2018). CIJA reports their evidence 
collection already provides sufficient 
links to Assad as well as to his deputies 
and to the widespread crimes being 
committed in Syria. CIJA also reports 
that there is only a limited time before 
Syria’s most serious perpetrators from 
Assad’s regime are being brought to 
justice and Assad will then follow suit. 
And when Assad withstands trial, the 
court will be presented with the best 
evidence that a tribunal has seen since 
Nuremberg (Carrillo, et al., 2016). 
  One of the most challenging 
problems war crime tribunals face 
is having financial support to create 
the court and keep the court running 
because tribunals that are independent 
of the ICC come with a great financial 
expense (Keating, 2012). However, 
the independent investigations being 
conducted by CIJA to collect evidence 
for a trial are being funded without a 
court mandate by state governments 
committed to bringing Assad and his 
perpetrators to justice (Carrillo, et 
al., 2016). In addition to governments 
specifically funding the investigations 
of Assad and the members of his 
government, CIJA receives financial 
support from the U.N. as well as a 
great number of outside sources (The 
Center for Justice & Accountability, 
2018). If states are already willing to 
fund the investigations of Assad’s crime 
in preparation of one day bringing 
Assad to trial, then it is likely that such 
states throughout the international 
community will remain committed 
to providing the necessary financial 
support to create a tribunal where 
Assad will be held accountable. 
There is evidence to suggest that the 
international community disapproves 
of Assad’s regime as there have already 
been efforts by the U.N. Security Council 
in 2014 to bring Assad to justice through 
the ICC. Vetoes from Russia and China 
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have been the most significant factors 
standing in the way of bringing Assad 
to justice through the ICC since 2014 
(Sengupta, 2014). Additionally, the 
Secretary General of the U.N. has publicly 
condemned the acts of the Assad 
regime as well and has moved to create 
resolutions to try to bring the atrocities 
to an end (Secretary-General, 2018). 
Aside from opposition from Russia and 
China, the international community as 
a whole and the U.N. have tried to pass 
resolutions giving the ICC jurisdiction 
over Assad and are currently funding 
CIJA investigations in preparation of a 
trial. There is reason to believe members 
of the international community will 
financially support a special tribunal to 
bring Assad to justice. 
 The primary purpose of the 
tribunal is to try Assad for international 
crimes, but the court will also have 
the capacity to try high-level Syrian 
government officials who are linked to 
carrying out Assad’s instructions. When 
considering the venue of the special 
tribunal, Syria is an unlikely location for 
the tribunal because the special tribunal 
will be designed to try highly politicized 
figures; therefore, locating the tribunal 
in Syria could incite violence and chaos 
while threatening the little stability and 
peace Syria has. The special tribunal 
would also be politically vulnerable to 
manipulation (Chadwick, 2017). Setting 
up the tribunal in Syria risks creating 
a special tribunal that is limited in 
charges and a rushed due process due to 
victims being unable to provide accurate 
testimony without fear of further 
persecution by the Syrian government. 
Syrian state agencies would also be 
unlikely to be willing to cooperate with 
the tribunal (Aboueldahab, 2017). 
Creating a special tribunal in Syria may 
not be a viable option, however, there 
are other likely options for the venue 
of a special tribunal for Assad. For 
instance, the SCSL used to try Taylor 
was originally located in Sierra Leone 
rather than in Liberia, where Taylor 
was president (Special Court for Sierra 
Leone). Locating Assad’s tribunal in a 
neighboring country such as Jordan or 
Turkey could be an option for Assad. 
Either Jordan or Turkey are ideal host 
countries for a special tribunal for 
Assad since both countries have been 
dramatically impacted by the spillover 
effects of the Syrian civil war. For 
instance, Jordan now hosts more than 
600,000 Syrian refugees and 10 percent 
of the country’s population is now 
Syrian and Turkey houses nearly 750,000 
refugees from Syria (Van Schaack, 2014). 
If the venue of the special tribunal 
were to be established in either of the 
neighboring countries of Jordan or 
Turkey, then the tribunal could more 
easily facilitate the integration of Syrian 
jurors, lawyers, and other staff members 
into the special tribunal. Either of these 
locations would give the special tribunal 
a greater degree of ownership and 
legitimacy that would also contribute 
to building domestic capacity (Van 
Schaack, 2014). If Jordan or Turkey were 
to agree to host the special tribunal, then 
the host country would be authorized 
to exercise domestic jurisdiction over 
Assad for the flight of Syrian refugees 
into Jordan and Turkey, and the political 
consequences the millions of refugees 
have caused (Van Schaack, 2014). 
 A second option for the venue 
of the special tribunal is The Hague. 
The Hague is the location of a number 
of tribunals and courts, including the 
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International Court of Justice and Peace 
and the ICC. The Hague is thought 
of as being the international city of 
peace and justice, and is the chosen 
venue of government and political 
leaders, diplomats, institutions, non-
profit organizations, and businesses 
when coming together to discuss 
solutions to global problems, resolve 
international disputes, or even to find 
solutions to avoid armed conflict. Not 
only is The Hague thought of as a city 
of international peace and justice, but 
The Hague is considered to be a neutral 
location, which often makes the location 
a logical choice for holding international 
conferences and addressing conflicts 
between countries throughout the 
international community (The Hague, 
2017). 
 The Hague has as served as 
the location of both the ICTY and SCSL 
as well as the location for the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 
and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (“Courts and Tribunals”). 
As previously mentioned, The SCSL 
was relocated from Sierra Leone to The 
Hague due to Taylor’s trial provoking 
violence and threatening West Africa’s 
peace and stability (Special Court 
for Sierra Leone). Taylor, being the 
former president of Liberia who was 
indicted for violating international 
laws, attracted global attention to his 
trial making his case a high-profile and 
closely followed trial, which contributed 
to the violence and threats of instability. 
The Hague provided a neutral and more 
peaceful environment for Taylor’s high-
profile trial to take place (Special Court 
for Sierra Leone). Assad is already a 
widely watched political figure as the 
president of Syria. However, Assad 
is also extensively monitored for his 
violations of international law and 
much of the international community 
is skeptical as to if justice will be served 
and Assad will be indicted and tried for 
his crimes (Carrillo, et al. 2016). This 
would contribute to the high-profile 
nature of his trial as a president. Syria, 
along with the rest of the international 
community, would likely follow Assad’s 
trial closely, which poses the risk of 
inciting violence in areas where his 
atrocities took place if the trial were to 
be held in a neighboring country. The 
Hague is a venue option to consider 
because the location would provide 
a more neutral location, eliminating 
possible outbreaks of violence and 
threats to stability and peace. 
 The crimes committed by 
Assad are clear, there is ample evidence 
sufficiently linking Assad to the mass 
atrocities throughout Syria since 2011, 
and there is a likely chance that members 
of the international community would 
be willing to financially support the 
tribunal. However, due to Assad 
being a sitting head of state, Assad 
has immunity from foreign criminal 
jurisdiction making Assad’s indictment 
the most complicated and doubtful 
part of determining the likelihood of 
trying Assad for international crimes 
(Kiyani, 2013). A possible option to 
indicting Assad is by the use of universal 
jurisdiction as this principle is generally 
used when traditional forms of criminal 
jurisdiction do not exist. 
 Universal jurisdiction is the 
principle that a national court has the 
authority to prosecute individuals for 
more serious international crimes that 
occur in other territories. (International 
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Justice Resource Center). Universal 
jurisdiction is based on the principle of 
responsibility to protect. This principle 
promotes the idea that members of the 
international community are obligated 
to assist states in providing protection 
to individuals within the territory of 
a given state through intervention to 
prevent crimes like crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, genocide, and 
torture (International Justice Resource 
Center). Therefore, any state whose 
has legislation that allows for universal 
jurisdiction to be invoked can actively 
prosecute a non-national individual 
for the most serious international 
crimes (Godhardt, 2017). Most states 
recognize universal jurisdiction and are 
signatories of conventions that provide 
the state to utilize universal jurisdiction 
when necessary (Human Rights Watch, 
2008). 
 The most significant reason 
as to why universal jurisdiction is an 
option to consider when trying Assad in 
a special tribunal is because universal 
jurisdiction prevents the impunity of 
dignitaries while ensuring due process 
of law (Godhardt, 2017). While Assad 
does have immunity as the current 
president of Syria, he will not be afforded 
this advantage if universal jurisdiction 
is invoked. Assad’s violations of 
international laws involve the illegal use 
of chemical weapons, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and torture 
(Kelly & Whiting, 2018). Each of the 
crimes Assad has committed qualify for 
a state to pursue the remedy of universal 
jurisdiction. There are several cases 
where universal jurisdiction has been 
used to successfully indict dignitaries. 
For example, Spain invoked universal 
jurisdiction to indict and extradite 
former Chilean dictator Augusto 
Pinochet. Spain also invoked universal 
jurisdiction to prosecute Guatemalan 
officials involved in the Guatemalan 
genocide and in a separate case to 
prosecute an Argentine naval officer for 
committing crimes against humanity 
during the Dirty War (International 
Justice Resource Center). Universal 
jurisdiction has yet to be applied to 
Assad because first the civil war in Syria 
must come to an end with one or more 
of the parties involved in the conflict 
claiming victory so the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions may come into effect. The 
obligations of the Geneva Conventions 
will then enable the prosecution of 
Assad and other high-ranking officials 
from the Assad regime who are linked 
to systematically carrying out Assad’s 
orders that violate international laws 
(Khen). 
Is Bringing Assad to Justice Possible?
 As the president of Syria, Assad has 
deliberately and indiscriminately 
attacked civilians in Syria since the 
outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 
(Human Rights Watch 2018). Assad 
has repeatedly used chemical weapons 
and nerve agents against civilian 
populations, employed starvation 
and withheld humanitarian aid, 
forcibly displaced Syrians and caused 
the disappearance of thousands of 
Syrians, and arbitrary arrested and 
used methods of torture. This led to the 
deaths of more than 400,000 people and 
the displacement of millions of Syrians 
over the last seven years (Human Rights 
Watch, 2018). Assad’s actions clearly 
violate international law under the 
Rome Statute allowing for Assad to be 
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charged with crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, the illegal use of chemical 
weapons, and torture (The International 
Criminal Court, 1998). After evaluating 
the cases of Miloševi  and Taylor, the 
most effective way for bringing Assad 
to justice will be through possibly 
invoking the legal remedy of universal 
jurisdiction and pursuing a trial through 
the creation of a special tribunal located 
in either a neighboring country or at 
The Hague. Additionally, the prospects 
of a guilty verdict are also likely with 
the vast amount of sufficient that has 
been collected directly linking Assad to 
his crimes. Bringing Assad to justice for 
his crimes is not likely to take place in 
the near future and will present many 
challenges and complications. However, 
indicting and trying Assad for violating 
international laws is possible and Assad 
may likely be held accountable for 
violating international laws many years 
in the future. 
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